




# Optimal Attack and Defense on Reinforcement Learning


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## Introduction



## Attack Surfaces




## Attack Problem

Attacker has its own reward  $g(s_t, a_t, r_t)$  that depends on the victim's.

**Definition** (Attack): Given  $\pi$ , the attacker wishes to compute,

$$\nu^* \in \arg \max_{\nu} \mathbb{E}_M^{\pi, \nu} \left[ \sum_{h=1}^H g(s_h, a_h, r_h) \right]$$

## Reduction to RL




## Defense Problem

Let  $(V_1^{\pi, \nu}, V_2^{\pi, \nu})$  denote the victim's and attacker's value, respectively.

**Definition** (Defense): The agent wishes to compute,

$$\pi^* \in \arg \max_{\pi} \min_{\nu \in BR(\pi)} \mathbb{E}_M^{\pi, \nu} \left[ \sum_{h=1}^H r(s_h, a_h) \right]$$
$$BR(\pi) := \arg \max_{\nu \in N} V_2^{\pi, \nu}$$

## Reduction to MARL




- Interaction forms a two-player turn-based Markov Game  $\bar{G}$
- Defenses correspond to a Weak Stackelberg Equilibrium (WSE)

## Tractable Solutions

**Proposition:** The defense problem is as hard as solving POMDPs. Thus, the defense problem is NP-hard to even approximate.

Key: Disallow Observation Attacks.



Both Efficiently Solvable!

## Efficient Algorithms

Generalized Rollback:

1. Victim determines Attacker's best response to any action  $a$ :

$$BR_h(s, a) = \arg \max_{a^\dagger \in \mathcal{A}(s, a)} [g_h(s, a, r_h(s, a)) + \mathbb{E}_{s' \sim P_h(s, a^\dagger)} [V_{h+1, 2}^*(s', \pi_{h+1}^*(s'))]]$$

2. Victim picks  $a$  based on the worst-case best-response:

$$V_{h, 1}^*(s) = \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \min_{a^\dagger \in BR_h(s, a)} [r_h(s, a^\dagger) + \mathbb{E}_{s' \sim P_h(s, a^\dagger)} [V_{h+1, 1}^*(s')]]$$

## Conclusions

- Optimal attacks can be efficiently computed for all attack surfaces.
- The defense problem is NP-hard to even approximate.
- Absent observation attacks, optimal defenses can be efficiently computed.